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Abstract:The end of the Cold War and the apparent “victory” of democracy witnessed a dramatic increase in
the number, diversity and proportion of states formally committed to democratic principles. Prominent
international law scholars argued vigorously that representative government was now an international
legal entitlement.
It is debatable that a right to pro-democratic action, that is intervention to promote democracy exist.
The determined reaction of the United Nations and the Organization of American States to the
September 1991 overthrow of popularly-elected Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the
attendant discussion within the Organization of American States about the possible use of force to
restore the “legitimate” government, certainly created the impression that such action –was becoming
politically palatable. An impression seemingly reinforced by the recent democratic crusade in Iraq
under the banner of “regime change” in Iraq.
However, the developing world is especially wary of the new world order democratic discourse which
is seen as promoting a conservative and protective form of liberal democracy hostile to the evolution of
other popular and participatory democratic processes and thus part of a subtle Western expansionist
agenda. The paper argues for a recognition that liberal democracy should adopt a composite and
heterogeneous, dimension that acknowledges democratic diversity. Further, for democracy to “work”
it must be the preference of a given citizenry and be anchored in the socio-political landscape of of the
specific community rather than be imposed from above by a third party. This crucial point has been
overlooked by many proponents of the right to democracy. It is argued that the direct replication of the
Western liberal democratic model should be alive to the reality that good governance is a complex
relationship between the government and governed not guaranteed simply by “importing” successful
and neutral “universalized” democratic norms .
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DEMOCRACY’S GLOBAL QUEST: A NOBLE CRUSADE
WRAPPED IN DIRTY REALITY?
[…virtually all initiatives--whether they be “development” “good governance” “democracy”
or the “rule of law”--or indeed, the earlier initiatives of ‘sovereignty’ and the very foundation
of international law, the nation-state--represent a basic movement from West to East. The
initiatives involve the transference of a set of institutions and practices which have ostensibly
been perfected in the European world and which must now be adopted in the non-European
world if it is to make any progress … the liberatory potential of such initiatives must be
viewed with skepticism, given that they are inevitably mired in a complex and ongoing set of
power relations between the European and none-European worlds. At the very least, these
initiatives suggest, often with an insidious and patronizing benevolence, that peoples in the
non-European worlds are lacking in their own ideas as to how their societies should be
structured, and what values they should prescribe and adopt.]1

I. Introduction

The end of the Cold War, which paralyzed the United Nations from its inception, was
a cause for celebration and hope. Western leaders congratulated themselves over the
end of communism and the fall of the Soviet empire. New challenges arising from the
strengthening of international human rights norms and the seemingly unprecedented
spirit of international cooperation accompanied the end of bipolar geostrategic and
ideological confrontation. Liberal-democratic political values increased immensely in
prestige in the wake of the collapse of the Communist Party states of Eastern Europe.2
Authoritarian regimes that for geopolitical reasons were once able to gain automatic
endorsement and recognition by either side of the Cold War bipolar divide found
themselves unable to do so as easily.
‘Whereas coups d’etat and rigged elections in the Cold War era were considered
business-as-usual,… they [were] now candidates for concerted international response,
not implausibly extending as far as internationally sanctioned armed intervention.’3
The first shots fired in the name of democracy occurred as the Cold War was
crumbling. In the aftermath of the 1989 Panamanian elections, there was widespread
agreement among observers, not only as to the fraudulent character of the elections
but also as to the landslide victory of the opposition Presidential candidate. This cast
the legitimacy of the Noriega regime into immediate crisis. Given the verified popular
mandate for a specific alternative government, the Bush Administration was not
bashful about making the restoration of democracy through armed force one of the
articulated objectives of its December 1989 invasion.4 The U.S. excited by the
seeming triumph of Western liberal democracy asserted before the Organization of
American States (O.A.S.) in 1989, in rhetorical justification of the U.S. invasion of
Panama the new wave of democracy:
(A) great principle is spreading across the world like wildfire. That principle,
as we all know, is the revolutionary idea that the people, not governments,
are sovereign. This principle has, in (the last) decade, . . . acquired the force
of historical necessity. . . . Democracy today is synonymous with legitimacy
the world over; it is, in short, the universal value of our time.5

2

In the words of Brad Roth: “Whereas the Reagan Doctrine had purportedly
emphasized counter intervention and support for indigenous insurgencies, the Bush
Administration, although proffering at least three alternative justifications, appeared
to adopt the illegitimacy thesis in its purest form.”6 At the time, the international
community was not impressed. Both the U.N. General Assembly and the O.A.S. voted
overwhelmingly to condemn the invasion,7 even though it was common knowledge
that the advent of democracy in Panama had been frustrated by General Manuel
Noriega’s authoritarian regime. Most states, (Latin American countries in particular)
rejected the notion that foreign nations could legitimately employ armed force or
other measures of coercion to seat a democratically elected government against the
will of an indigenous political elite in effective control of the state.8 Indeed, many
states questioned the propriety of any attempt by foreign states to influence domestic
political processes.9 In an eloquent articulation, Brad Roth observes that:
Although U.S. invocation of the illegitimacy thesis to support unilateral uses
of force did not by itself signify a change in international law, customary or
otherwise, the development of international sensibilities should not be
overlooked. While the international community formally repudiated
invocation of the illegitimacy thesis, it not only failed to impose sanctions
against the United States, but continued to look to the United States for
international leadership (especially in the Persian Gulf crisis)
notwithstanding what might have been characterized as America’s
irresponsible attitude toward the use of force and its outright contempt for
U.N. and World Court censure of its policies. Moreover, the … Panama
action resulted in the formation of a government that the international
community promptly recognized.10
It was the unilateralism of the Panama action that guaranteed its broad rejection by the
international community. With the sanctity of State sovereignty breached, the possible
consequences of intervention for traditional concepts of international law was too
profound for States to accept notwithstanding the fact that the concept of
governmental legitimacy was being fundamentally altered in the post-Cold War era.11
Once States got over their initial jitteriness, states appeared increasingly inclined to
condone military interventions to restore democracy even though, under traditional
legal analysis, such interventions fell on rather uncertain legal ground.12 The postCold War era witnessed frequent condemnations of coups particularly in Latin
America. The O.A.S. condemned attempted coups in Surinam and Venezuela, and
opposed the now famous “autogolpes” in Peru and Guatemala.13 The O.A.S. also sent
election monitors and human rights observers to join U.N. personnel in overseeing the
electoral processes in Nicaragua, Haiti, and other member states. Most significantly,
the O.A.S., along with virtually the entire international community, condemned the
Haitian military’s unconstitutional overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide with
the O.A.S. acquiescing in the Security Council’s decision to authorize U.S. military
intervention to restore the deposed President to power.14
While the mantra “democracy is an idea whose time has come” was loudly trumpeted,
the content of democracy--its criteria and benchmarks--remained bogged down in a
quagmire of political and human rights discourse. Prominent international law
scholars argued vigorously that representative government was an emerging
international legal entitlement.15 Some commentators such as Detter went as far as
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adding democracy and viability to the first three criteria of the Montevideo
Convention, describing democracy as the lynchpin of the definition of new nationstates.16 Historians and political scientists put forth studies that suggested democracies
almost never make war on other democracies17 while politicians asserted important
security interests in the spread of democratic governance. As David Wippman notes,
“[i]nternational civil servants proclaim[ed] a new shared consensus that democracy,
human rights, and peace are inextricably linked. Heads of state routinely announce[d]
their fealty to democratic norms, and insist[ed] that leaders of other states do so as
well.”18 International organizations passed resolutions announcing that governmental
legitimacy rests on the consent of the governed, and conditioned membership in their
organizations on acceptance of democratic principles.19 Even developing countries,
once near monolithic in their opposition to any external involvement in domestic
politics, began to commonly seek international legitimacy through external
monitoring and even supervision of their electoral processes.20
The early post-Cold War years witnessed a dramatic increase in the number, diversity
and proportion of states formally committed to democratic principles.21 Many states
displayed a greater willingness to countenance foreign intervention in the name of
democracy and human rights than at any time in the 20th century.22 But in many
respects, the rhetoric in this area outpaced reality. Although it is debatable that a right
to pro-democratic action,23 that is intervention to promote democracy, does not exist,
such action has certainly become more politically palatable.24 Change in this area is
neither as extensive nor as legitimacy-oriented as many have suggested.25
The determined reaction of the United Nations and the Organization of American
States (O.A.S.) to the September 1991 overthrow of popularly-elected Haitian
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the attendant discussion within the O.A.S. about
the possible use of force to restore the “legitimate” government, attested to a shift in
attitude.26 However, past interventions into domestic affairs and the attendant
murkiness surrounding these interventions curtailed any development of a broad right
of pro-democratic intervention despite the broad regional and international support for
action in Haiti. After all the international community did not need to dig deep into the
annals of history to refresh their memories of past actions that involved military
intervention to unseat democratic government or to prevent democracy all carried out
in the name of democracy.27
Controversy continues to shadow the question of governmental legitimacy.
Democracy is replete with complexity and ambiguity. Popular will, even if said to be
the sole criterion, operates at more than one level. Consensus judgment of usurpation
of people’s will is the exception rather than the norm. Notions of self-determination
and national equality often prevent broad international consensus Democratic
entitlement as a universal human right is a complex and multifaceted issue. The
Article commences with an overview of the development of democracy as a universal
entitlement within the U.N. system. It then casts an eye on the enshrinement of this
concept has evidenced by the spate of regional efforts in this direction in the postCold War era. Having laid down the evolution of the concept, the Article turns to a
critique of the thorny issues attendant surrounding this universal entitlement.
The central theme of the critique is the fact that in the face of reality, the democratic
ideal finds itself caught between two opposing forces, the idea not to impose alien
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values and processes on sovereign nations (as this amounts to deprivation of political
independence and self-determination), but at the same time not to accept assertions of
sovereignty simply because a ruler has the brute strength to assert it. The end of the
Cold War saw the ascendance of liberal democracy as the basis of a new world order
but this ascendance is seen as strengthening a restrictive practice of democracy and
threatening to the recognition of democratic heterogeneity. The developing world is
especially wary of the new world order democratic discourse which is seen as
promoting a conservative and protective form of liberal democracy hostile to the
evolution of other popular and participatory democratic processes and thus part of a
subtle Western expansionist agenda. The section argues for a recognition that liberal
democracy in its advance to other countries should adopt a composite and
heterogeneous, dimension that acknowledges democratic diversity thus freeing it from
its narrow and restrictive liberal roots. To succeed as an unchallenged universal
concept, democracy should value diversity and communality.
II. Sowing the Seeds: Universalizing Democracy

Traditional international law has generally regarded the peoples of the world as being
represented in the international arena by the governments in de facto or de jure control
of their respective states. The method by which a government of domestic origin
achieves or retains power was not ordinarily thought of as a basis for withholding
such recognition. As US Chief Justice Taft ruled in the Tinoco Arbitration, the
domestic constitutionality of the seizure of power is considered beyond the scope of
international concern:
The issue is not whether the new government assumes power or conducts its
administration under constitutional limitations established by the people
during the incumbency of the government it has overthrown. The question is,
has it really established itself in such a way that all within its influence
recognize its control, and that there is no opposing force assuming to be a
government in its place? Is it discharging its functions as a government
within its own jurisdiction?28
Four decades later, amidst the creation of the United Nations (U.N.) and its provisions
trumpeting the right of citizenry to participation and the protection of this right by
international law, the principle still held sway and was to hold sway way into the
future. In 1961, Professor Hans Kelsen restated the principle as follows:
[U]nder what circumstances does a national legal order begin to be valid?
The answer given by international law is that a national legal order begins to
be valid as soon as it has become--on the whole--efficacious, and it ceases to
be valid as soon as it loses this efficacy … The Government brought into
power by a revolution or coup d’etat is, according to international law, the
legitimate government of the state, whose identity is not affected by these
events.29
In the 1970s and early 1980s many nation-states and in particular the United Kingdom
signaled a move away from the constitutive theory championed by Hans Kelsen by
stating that they would no longer grant or withhold recognition of governments, since
a policy of recognizing governments gave the impression that their policy of
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recognizing governments was based on political acceptability. Instead they would
only recognize nation-states in accordance with international law.30 The persistently
vexing question in recognition practice was and continues to be the criteria for
recognition since issues of fact-finding come into play.31 The authors identify popular
support based on governmental legitimacy as the most controversial and contested of
the general criteria. This was readily apparent in the Cold War. Determining which
faction in a civil war enjoyed “popular support,” for example, was largely decided by
ideological preferences during the Cold War.32 Though states agreed upon standards
which were objective in theory, they readily injected politics into the actual operation
of the standard. As Thomas D Grant notes, ‘[t]he principle [of legitimism] has not
been stable in its content over time, but in one form or another, legitimism has played
a role in numerous decisions about recognition.’33
During the Cold War, it was nearly impossible for the international community as a
whole to agree both that a particular state was undemocratic and that international
action should be taken against that state-- the United States (and the Western Bloc)
referred to democracy and anti-communist policy as legitimating criteria; the Soviet
Union (and the Eastern Bloc) to socialism. The single exception concerned the
process of decolonization. A consensus gradually developed within the UN that the
denial of majority self-rule in the colonial territories of Africa and Asia should be
treated as an international delict.34 The nature of the Cold War facilitated the
entrenchment of self-determination as a jus cogens norm and the development of the
comparatively firmly rooted criteria that a government be denied recognition if its
origins violated this jus cogens norm. When white minority regimes in South Africa
and elsewhere resisted the transition to majority rule, states could agree, within the
context of the UN system, to apply economic and diplomatic sanctions.35 By defining
apartheid regimes as per se violative of international law,36 states could treat the
character of the white minority governments as a legitimate subject for international
action, without exposing all undemocratic regimes to similar scrutiny and pressure.
It is significant that in the case of South African diplomatic credentials were denied
on the basis of the internal character of the regime.37 Through its de jure violations of
one of the U.N. Charter’s few unambiguous and broadly supported norms--racial
equality--the South African Government subjected itself to ever-increasing scrutiny
and disapproval from the General Assembly, embodied in innumerable resolutions,
including refusals to take action on credentials. These measures culminated in the
passage by the General Assembly of a resolution declaring that the South African
regime had no right to represent the people of South Africa and that the liberation
movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity were the authentic
representatives of the overwhelming majority of the South African people.38 The
general consensus regarding the illegality of the South African regime was an
exception as the history of U.N. credentials controversies in the Cold War era attests.
It is instructive that the international community’s views in this era regarding regime
legitimacy were generally permissive and often international recognition of
governments favored the government (whether legitimate or illegitimate) in effective
power rather than some seemingly legitimate putative authority.39 This was
notwithstanding General Assembly passed Resolution 396, passed shortly after the
U.N. was created. This Resolution states clearly that:
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whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to
represent a Member State in the United Nations and this question becomes
the subject of controversy in the United Nations, the question should be
considered in the light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the
circumstances of each case....40 [Emphasis added]
Though the idea that the international community can protect human rights was one of
the great practical achievements manifested in the U.N. Charter with international law
at the vanguard of giving tangible expression to the rights, the Cold War tied the issue
to ideological and revolutionary agendas. ‘Common interest’ and ‘common good’
were seen as nothing more than a diplomatic screen hiding the avaricious and
predatory aims of the imperialist Powers.41 The effect of this position was to
strengthen sovereignty considerations as the UN became a ground for cultivating the
agenda of nationalism brought to the fore with the appearance of the ‘Third World’ as
a force in the years after World War II. Realpolitik not law was the governing force in
the Cold War era with the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter frozen on paper
and rarely seen in practice.
Amidst the volatile Cold War era politics, the UN was making steady progress in
support of democratic governance. The first step was taken three short years after its
formation when the U.N. adopted the groundbreaking Universal Declaration on
Human Rights by consensus.42 A number of articles in the Universal Declaration
substantiate provisions of the U.N. Charter relating to the rights of the citizenry in
member states. Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter contain specific provisions in
this respect. Article 55(c) of the U.N. Charter commits the Organization to the
promotion of “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” Under
Article 56, “All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in
Article 55.” Although falling far short of authorizing intervention--unilateral or
multilateral--to compel compliance with human rights standards, these provisions do
make clear that the pursuit of human rights does not, as such, constitute intervention
“in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction” under Article 2(7).
The United Nations promulgated instruments that are collectively equivalent to an
International Bill of Rights43 and helped gather international consensus for the idea
that the populations of States have rights under international law. This extends to the
protection of the rights, even against the government. Beginning with the Charter and
the Universal Declaration, the U.N. has constructed a normative framework for the
realization of rights for the people.44 The framework has been sustained over time by
the actions of States in signing and ratifying various international human rights and
related instruments, some of which are now part of customary international law. The
international collaborative efforts involving United Nations organs, human rights
workers and others have helped publicize the plight of the oppressed millions who
yearn for more personal liberties and freedom from arbitrary detention, execution and
political purges.
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Among the human rights deemed fit objects of international concern is the right of
political participation. This right was embodied in Article 21 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives.
2. Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government;
this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be
by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by
equivalent free voting procedures.45
Article 21 of the Declaration states that “[t]he will of the people shall be the basis of
the authority of government,” and that “this will shall be expressed in periodic and
genuine elections.”46 Implicitly, then, Article 21 links governmental legitimacy to
respect for the popular will. But this linkage does not appear in the subsequent, and
legally binding, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).47
Article 25 of the Covenant speaks of the right to participate in public affairs-including the right to genuine and periodic elections--but it does not purport to
condition governmental authority on respect for the will of the people.48 The language
of Article 25 was intentionally drafted broadly enough to accommodate the wide
range of governmental systems in place among the initial parties to the Covenant.49
As a result, even Soviet-bloc states felt free to ratify the Covenant.50 From their
perspective, communist states satisfied the requirements of Article 25 by affording
voters access to various participatory mechanisms as well as an opportunity to ratify
their leadership in periodic, albeit single-party, elections.51 Thus, the cost of
consensus was language broad enough to obscure sharp differences among states on
the nature of their commitment to democratic rule. The differences between the two
articulations in the Universal Declaration and ICCPR are interesting. Brad Roth
explains that:
Article 21 of the Declaration can be read syllogistically to mean that the
basis of governmental authority is such popular will as has been expressed in
the elections, whereas non-liberal regimes would prefer it to mean that the
popular will is (in some abstract sense) the basis of--and therefore expressed
by--governmental authority, and is also expressed in elections. The Covenant
version simplifies the matter by leaving undefined the relationship, if any,
not only between authority and elections, but also between authority and
participation.52
Tragically, outside of the decolonization context, during the Cold War era, there was
little international consensus on the requirements of democratic governance beyond
the general but limited insistence on periodic and genuine elections found in the
ICCPR and a number of other international legal instruments. As a result, states
lacked generally accepted criteria by which to judge other states’ compliance with
substantive democratic principles.53 With the end of the bi-polar ideological
competition that characterized the Cold War,54 there has been a widely publicized
shift in the character of public pronouncements about democracy. More states have
made, through treaty or by means of non-binding but still influential declarations,
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formal commitments to democratic governance.55 In addition, states, international
organizations, human rights tribunals, and legal scholars have sought increasingly to
imbue that commitment with some real content--to move beyond the simple but vague
commitment to free elections contained in the ICCPR.56
The democracy discourse however remains “straitjacketed” by Article 2(7) of the
U.N. Charter which prohibits intervention in the “domestic affairs” of other states.
This Article remains a pillar of the U.N. Charter system and continues to cast a
shadow over all debates relating to government legitimacy or illegitimacy.
Accordingly, although many states have joined the promulgation of resolutions and
declarations proclaiming support for democracy and the right of political
participation,57 they also stress that each state has the “sovereign right freely to choose
and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems, whether or not they
conform to the preferences of other states.”58 Though the international community
may, under Articles 55 and 56, promote state observance of the right of citizens to
participate in their governance, there is no clear authority to mandate a particular
allocation of decision-making power within a sovereign state. In any event, an
election’s “genuineness,” as referred to by both participation provisions, has no
obvious criteria.
In a bid to give the participation provisions content and contour, in December 1988,
the General Assembly called on the U.N. Human Rights Commission “to consider
appropriate ways and means of enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of
periodic and genuine elections,” albeit “in the context of full respect for the
sovereignty of Member States...” The result adopted by the Economic and Social
Council in May 1989 was a “framework for future efforts,” the first heading of which
was “The will of the people expressed through periodic and genuine elections as the
basis for the authority of government,” a phrase that clears up the above--mentioned
ambiguity in Article 21 of the Declaration. The document included mention of, inter
alia, “the right of citizens of a State to change their governmental system through
appropriate constitutional means,” “the right of candidates to put forward their
political views, individually and in cooperation with others,” and the need for
“independent supervision” of elections. Two years later, the General Assembly, with
only eight dissenting votes, declared “that determining the will of the people requires
an electoral process that provides an equal opportunity for all citizens to become
candidates and put forward their political views, individually and in co-operation with
others...” It nonetheless immediately added the words, “as provided in national
constitutions and laws,” and further recognized:
that the efforts of the international community to enhance the effectiveness
of the principle of periodic and genuine elections shall not call into question
each State’s sovereign right freely to choose and develop its political, social,
economic and cultural systems, whether or not they conform to the
preferences of other states.59
In yet another significant move in the early days of the post-Cold War era, support for
democracy became increasingly identified with the maintenance of peace and
security. The reaction to the 29 September 1991 Haitian coup seemed to evidence that
the norm of popular participation was coming into its own as an international index of
governmental legitimacy, at least where the international community has already
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become enmeshed (through the “observer” function) in domestic processes.
Resolution 917 declared that the obstruction of the restoration of democracy in Haiti
constituted a threat to peace. By imposing sanctions and authorizing military
intervention in order to restore democratic rule in Haiti, the Security Council further
recognized democracy as an entitlement. The Security Council corroborated the claim
of a population’s right to be governed by those whom they had elected freely, fairly
and openly. On the adoption of Resolution 940, U.S. Representative to the United
Nations Madeleine K. Albright stated that the resolution’s objective was “not to
impinge upon the sovereignty of Haiti, but to restore the power to exercise that
sovereignty to those who rightfully possessed it and to enable Haiti, in the words of
the United Nations Charter, to pursue “social progress and better standards of life in
larger freedom.”60 This echoed the sentiments that had been aired earlier by Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, the then Secretary-General of the U.N. at the historic Security Council
Summit Meeting of January 1992.61
The Aristide Government had won an overwhelming victory in internationally
monitored elections just nine months prior to a coup by an incompetent military
notorious for human rights abuses and disrespect for democratic processes. In the
words of Brad Roth: “As the elected leadership remained physically intact, there was
no contest over the mandate to articulate the will of the ‘legitimate’ government.
Although the coup leadership had support in the elected legislature and cited human
rights abuses allegedly encouraged by Aristide, its violent conduct and unsavory
history belied any claim to be acting on behalf of democracy and human rights.’62
Considering that the concept of popular sovereignty is at the heart of the emerging
right to restore democracy, Michael Reisman notes that “sovereignty can be violated
as effectively and ruthlessly by an indigenous as by an outside force, in much the
same way that the wealth and natural resources of a country can be spoliated as
thoroughly and efficiently by a native as by a foreigner.”63 Seen in this manner, the
sovereignty of Haiti was violated when the will of the people, ascertained in open,
free and fair elections, was thwarted by violent means. In the words of Lois Fielding,
‘… the right of self-determination signal [ed] “a radical decision that henceforth the
internal authority of governments would be appraised internationally.” Further, the
appearance of “criteria for appraising the conformity of internal governance with
international standards of democracy” was evidence of the rise of popular
sovereignty.’64
III. Reaping the Fruit: Entrenching Democracy

The idea of democracy is supported by fundamental instruments of multilateralism.
The U.N. Charter under Chapter I, Article 1(2), provides that “[t]he Purposes of the
United Nations are . . . [t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples …” Other important
instruments articulating this right are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Universal Declaration
states: “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this
will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting
procedures.”65 The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
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and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provide that: “All peoples
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.”66
Professor Thomas Franck argues that these documents together with regional
instruments constitute “a net of participatory entitlements.”67 Commentators note that
the right to democracy has developed within international agreements. Professor
Thomas Franck finds that democracy, “while not yet fully word made law, is rapidly
becoming in our time, a normative rule of the international system.”68 On his part,
Gregory Fox asserts that “parties to the major human rights conventions have created
an international law of participatory rights.”69
The assertion that the principle of democracy and the rights which together constitute
the democratic prerogative are “guaranteed in all comprehensive human rights
instruments”,70 is not empty rhetoric. Infact the greatest progress in specifying the
elements of democratic governance has been made in regional systems and, in
particular, within the O.S.C.E.71 At a 1990 meeting in Copenhagen, for example,
members of the O.S.C.E. (then referred to as the C.S.C.E.) spelled out some of the
characteristics of democratic systems and the rule of law.72 This list included: 1) free
elections; 2) the need for representative government; 3) accountability of the
executive to an elected legislature or the electorate as a whole; 4) a clear separation
between the State and political parties; 5) an independent judiciary; 6) military and
police forces under civilian control; and 7) a panoply of related human rights.73
Importantly, in addition to guaranteeing democratic freedoms to the individual, recent
instruments view democracy as both a keystone of human rights and a necessary
condition for international peace and security. Reflecting the proliferation of
democracies throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Document of Copenhagen commits
participating states to the individual freedoms of democracy, including free elections,
representative government, government compliance with law, and separation between
the State and political parties. The C.S.C.E.’s Charter of Paris pledges to “undertake
to build, consolidate, and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of
our nations.”74 In addition to guaranteeing democratic freedoms to every individual,
the thirty-four participating states proclaimed: “Democracy is the best safeguard of
freedom of expression, tolerance of all groups of society, and equality of opportunity
for each person.”75 In the Moscow meeting of the C.S.C.E., participating states
asserted that “full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the
development of societies based on pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are
prerequisites for a lasting order of peace, security, justice and co-operation in
Europe.”76 Participating states found that “issues relating to human rights,
fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law are of international concern, as
respect for these rights and freedoms constitutes one of the foundations of the
international order.”77
International conferences in the 1990s mirrored the C.S.C.E.’s concerns. The Vienna
Declaration of the UN World Conference on Human Rights “considers the denial of
the right of self-determination as a violation of human rights and underlines the
importance of the effective realization of this right.”78 The participating states
expressly defined self-determination to include a democratic entitlement, noting that it
is through self-determination that peoples “freely determine their political status, and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”79 The Vienna
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Declaration further affirmed that the “World Conference on Human Rights considers
the denial of the right of self-determination as a violation of human rights and
underlines the importance of the effective realization of this right.”80 The participating
states asserted that “[d]emocracy, development and respect for human rights, and
fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing.” Finally, the
participating states agreed that “[d]emocracy is based on the freely expressed will of
the people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and
their full participation in all aspects of their lives.”81
Regional initiatives together with the U.N. monitoring of elections have clarified the
substantive meaning of the emerging right to democracy.82 Gregory Fox lists criteria
gathered from human rights instruments and UN practice in monitoring elections that
define a free and fair election. These include:
1. periodic elections at reasonable intervals;
2. a secret ballot;
3. honesty in vote tabulation;
4. universal suffrage, with minor exceptions permitted for minors, prisoners,
the mentally ill, and the like;
5. an absence of discrimination against voters and candidates;
6. freedom to organize and join political parties, which must be given equal
access to the ballot, and an equal opportunity to campaign;
7. to the extent the government controls the media, the right of all parties to
present their views through the major media outlets;
8. supervision of the election by an independent council or commission not
tied to any party, faction, or individual, whose impartiality is insured in both
law and practice.”83
Policy trends of actors in the world community have further encouraged democracy as
a right.84 The United Nations has monitored over thirty elections, including those in
Namibia, Nicaragua, and Haiti.85 Several Western European nations have attempted to
withhold aid from those nations that are not democracies. On a regional level, the
European Community and the United States have imposed on countries, such as the
former Yugoslavia and the Balkan States, “conditions on recognition” that include a
commitment to democratic governance.86 Additionally, restoration of democracy and
the right of self-determination has figured prominently in the lawfulness of military
action in the southern hemisphere. Today, many countries notably in the Third World
consider a clean bill of health from foreign electoral observers as an important aspect
of demonstrating their commitment and adherence to democratic ideals.87
The biggest stumbling block though in the move towards democracy as an entitlement
is that both within the U.N. and regional organizations there is no special set of
institutional procedures for handling interruptions in democratic governance, much
less for addressing undemocratic regimes generally. As a result, any effort to promote
democracy through the political organs of the U.N. is subject to all the vagaries of
U.N. politics. The procedures within regional organizations are little better. The
Moscow and Copenhagen documents commit the member states, morally if not
legally, to “defend and protect” the “democratic order” in any participating state
against a violent overthrow.88 But the steps to be taken are not specified, not even to
the extent of outlining the institutional procedures to be followed to determine what
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those steps should be. Although one author has argued that the Copenhagen
Document implicitly authorizes military intervention to protect democracy,89 it seems
unlikely that the signatories would interpret it this way.
Despite acknowledgment of democracy as an entitlement there exist minimal
international and regional procedures for responding to unconstitutional seizures of
power and flawed elections. Steps to be taken are not specified with regional and
international efforts constrained by the non-intervention provisions of the U.N.
Charter90 and continued opposition of states to anything that might open the door too
widely to intervention in internal affairs. There is simply no consensus, within
regional and other international organizations, particularly the UN, on strengthening
significantly their institutional capacity to promote democracy. Any substantial
departure from present practice must survive the critical scrutiny of veto-wielding
states such as China and Russia91 as well as potentially hostile regional blocs in the
Middle East, Asia and Africa. As a result of differences among states, departures from
democratic principles are likely to prompt a significant collective international
response by the U.N., only in exceptional circumstances. On rare occasions, as in
Haiti, it may prove possible for states to agree on collective measures to restore the
ousted government to power,92 but in general, easy cases of the sort represented by
Haiti continue to be very few and far between.
However, as the US intervention in Panama shows, the U.S. is not so reluctant, and in
fact is prepared to act unilaterally, often outside the U.N. dispute resolution
mechanism, (and in the case of the recent intervention in Iraq, will completely ignore
the U.N.). The action taken in Haiti was to restore democracy93, and that is something
far different from what the U.S. sought to achieve in Panama and Iraq, namely to
create a democracy where none previously existed and what is even more significant
is the US was prepared to use force to do so. This form of “pro-democratic action” or
as the current Bush administration has labeled it, “regime change” is a far cry from
protecting a right to democracy, which is what occurred in Haiti, the action taken in
Panama and Iraq, is in fact a denial of choice and freedom.94 It is also nothing new.
IV. Pro-Democratic Action: Protecting the Crop?

The right to political participation which provides a platform for intervention in
matters that have been traditionally regarded as within the domestic jurisdiction of a
state represents a fundamental departure from classic international law. However, the
project of democratic governance and pro-democratic action, heralded as a new
advance in the development of international law (especially in the post-Cold War era),
has a much older lineage.
Often forgotten is the intervention in post-World War I Russia in 1919 by the Allies,
mainly the US and Great Britain. The Allies sought to overthrow the Bolsheviks who
had risen to power through the Russian Revolution in 1917. The intervention was
through moral and military support to the “White Russians” opposing the “Red
Russians” (Bolsheviks). The intervention was justified on the grounds of self-defense
which afforded a legitimate ground in international law albeit a dubious one in the
circumstances. The real motive was the fact that the emerging Soviet government
based on communism “threatened” the capitalist world and sought to negate Western
liberal-democracy principles as the basis of government. The intervention also
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presented an opportunity to satisfy Woodrow Wilson’s desire to see selfdetermination applied in Russia however this meant only one thing to the West--a
right to democratic government. In other words though intervention was premised on
the right of the Russian citizenry to choose a mode of governance, the right of choice
was negated by the fact that the U.S. and Western European Powers clearly
discounted Communism as being among the choices.95 Wilson’s idealism and the
Western European pro-democratic agenda soon fell casualty to isolationism and
nationalism.
As the U.S. withdrew from the international arena, European States increasingly
gravitated towards aggressive nationalism. Domestic political institutions (of
whatever form and character) were seen as essential components of a unique national
culture which needed to be jealously protected from external pressures. States
retreated to the fortress--like conception of Westphalian sovereignty which Wilsonian
idealism had sought to dilute. This retreat effectively reaffirmed the classic
international law position that governments had an absolute monopoly over
fundamental internal political decisions, as well as over legislative, executive and
judicial structures.96 Idealism was shoved to the background and nationalism gained
ascendance leading to the outbreak of the Second World War. It was against the
background of sovereign excesses pursued by fascist governments that the
international community sought to craft a new world order to move the citizenry from
the periphery to the center of international discourse. Naturally the agenda was firmly
in the hands of the victorious Allies dominated by states with liberal-democratic
structures. But the Cold War that set in shortly thereafter was to negate the practice of
the lofty ideals relating to political participation by the citizenry that were laid down
in various important UN treaties and resolutions and reaffirmed in various
international and national declarations and proclamations.
The Cold War shepherded pragmatic pro-democracy discourse away from
international and regional agendas. A re-invigorated respect for sovereignty, reignited by the nationalistic sentiments of the emerging Third World once again
prevented international law from scrutinizing or legally assessing the character of the
government of a state.97 In practice, how the government of a state was conducted,
particularly in terms of the relationship between government and its citizens
continued to be largely a matter outside the proper scope of international law98 despite
the lofty ideals expressed in the U.N. Charter, the UDHR, ICCPR and related
proclamations. Ironically, democracy was an ideal shared by both the Communist and
Capitalist blocs. But the substantive and ideological divide was great. Western liberal
democracy emphasized individualism, self-interest and liberty, and Eastern Socialist
democracy stressed collectivism and equality. In the shadow of the East/West divide,
democratic principles provided the framework for diverse popular movements
producing many different accounts of democracy. The volatile geopolitics of the Cold
War created fertile ground for covert activity by the two superpowers seeking to
“spread” their ideologies. At the socio-political level it was essentially a seesaw battle
of socialism versus Western liberalism.
The covert involvement of the US, the world’s leading and most powerful democracy,
in the internal affairs of Nicaragua, is a “recent” and noteworthy example99 that bears
general parallels to the intervention in Russia, albeit against a different geopolitical
landscape. U.S. involvement in Nicaragua essentially involved support to the Contras-
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-a counter-revolutionary movement.100 The US’s involvement was extensive and
eventually led to Nicaragua seeking to resolve the matter through the International
Court of Justice (I.C.J.).101 Although the sole justification offered before the World
Court by the U.S. was collective self-defense, it is possible that this argument was
taken even less seriously by the policy’s supporters than by its opponents. Even
before the matter appeared before the I.C.J., the governmental illegitimacy thesis had
already been betrayed by the US itself in a report presented by President Reagan to
Congress on 10 April 1985. The report stated in no uncertain terms that one of the
changes which the United States was seeking from the Nicaraguan Government was:
“implementation of Sandinista commitment to the Organization of American States to
political pluralism, human rights, free elections, non-alignment, and a mixed
economy”.102 A fuller statement of those views was contained in a formal finding by
Congress issued by the U.S. Congress three months later on 29 July 1985.103
The political justifications for U.S. policy and action consistently emphasized the
internal character of the Nicaragua regime, to such an extent that the Court felt
compelled to address arguments beyond the pleadings. As the Court pointed out, the
July 29, 1985, finding of the U.S. Congress based support for the Contras on alleged
Sandinista breaches of “solemn commitments to the Nicaraguan people, the United
States, and the Organization of American States” regarding democracy and human
rights.104 Although “advanced solely in a political context” and “not advanced as legal
arguments,” these contentions prompted the Court to make specific admonitions
against any principle of “ideological intervention” and any unilateral right of states to
use force to compel compliance even with legally binding “commitments” regarding
internal policy.105 The World Court emphatically noted that:
…it strains belief to suppose that a body formed in armed opposition to the
Government of Nicaragua, and calling itself the ‘Nicaraguan Democratic
Force’, [the group supported by the US] intended only to check Nicaraguan
interference in El Salvador and did not intend to achieve violent change of
government in Nicaragua.106 [Emphasis added]
The core of the US’s decision to intervene was because the Nicaraguan government
had decided not to hold elections, in effect reneging on “promises” made earlier: and
the US had appointed itself as the “guardian” responsible to ensure that these
“promises” be kept.107 The I.C.J. quite rightly determined that the U.S. action was
unlawful intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign nation-state and more
importantly reaffirmed the right of Nicaragua and indeed, any nation-state to choose
its political and economic system. In the Court’s candid observation:
The questions as to which the Nicaraguan Government is said to have
entered into a commitment are questions of domestic policy. The Court
would not therefore normally consider it appropriate to engage in a
verification of the truth of assertions of this kind, even assuming that it was
in a position to do so. A State’s domestic policy falls within its exclusive
jurisdiction, provided of course that it does not violate any obligation of
international law. Every State possesses a fundamental right to choose and
implement its own political, economic and social systems…108[Emphasis
added]
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And further:
The finding of the United States Congress also expressed the view that the
Nicaraguan Government had taken “significant steps towards establishing a
totalitarian Communist dictatorship”. However the regime in Nicaragua be
defined, adherence by a State to any particular doctrine does not constitute a
violation of customary international law; to hold otherwise would make
nonsense of the fundamental principle of State sovereignty, on which the
whole of international law rests, and the freedom of choice of the political,
social, economic and cultural system of a State. Consequently, Nicaragua’s
domestic policy options, even assuming that they correspond to the description
given of them by the Congress finding, cannot justify on the legal plane the
various actions of the Respondent complained of. The Court cannot
contemplate the creation of a new rule opening up a right of intervention by
one State against another on the ground that the latter has opted for some
particular ideology or political system.109 [Emphasis added]
The World Court thus expressed its discomfort with the U.S. endeavors to force a
political, economic and social system on Nicaragua by restating the fundamental right
of every State to choose and implement its own socio-political structure. Though
obiter, the Court’s statement was significant and raises a critical distinction between
the preference for a democratic government, and proceeding to simply impose one,
without the consent of the relevant citizenry identified as its beneficiaries.
While it may be argued that the I.C.J.’s pronouncements in the Nicaragua Case were
made against the backdrop of the volatile power-politics of the Cold War and thus do
not reflect the position of the new spirit that accompanied the end of the Cold war, the
pronouncements were broadly reaffirmed in two post-Cold War U.N. Resolutions
relating to the matter. Notwithstanding the protective democratic proclamations and
action plans emerging in the post-Cold War new world order context, the General
Assembly displayed the great caution mirrored by the I.C.J. Two post-Cold War
resolutions, which refer to the monitoring of democratic elections, bear this out.110
The first resolution supports international monitoring of elections and stresses the
indispensability of “periodic and genuine elections” to ensure protection of the
governed, and identifies “the right of everyone to take part in the government of his or
her country.”111 The second resolution does not support the international monitoring
of elections but states:
that it is the concern solely of peoples [of each state] to determine methods
and to establish institutions regarding the electoral process, as well as to
determine the ways for its implementation according to their constitutional
and national legislation ... [urging all states] to respect the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of States.112
In a comment on the implications of these two resolutions, Professor Dianne Otto
observes that:
The incongruity of these resolutions reconfirms the presence of two versions of
democratic entitlement at international law: one that is restrictive and controlling, and
another that tentatively takes a stance of openness to different democratic forms.
Thus, despite the claims by proponents of the new world order, it is possible to
conclude that the international legal system is not yet fully committed to conservative
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liberal democracy as the universal democratic form upon which a state's legitimacy is
founded. However, the grounds for defending such a conclusion are diminishing
rapidly. The growing emphasis on democratic standardization and enforcement is
shifting the balance strongly towards the primacy of protective liberal democracy and
away from any possibility of the legal recognition of democratic diversity.113
Having clarified that the I.C.J.’s Cold War pronouncements were not extinguished nor
diminished by the spirit of the so-called post-Cold War new world order, the Article
continues with its discussion of the decision. The I.C.J.’s pronouncements besides
reaffirming the right of every state to organize its socio-political affairs and structures
as it deems fit also raised a very fundamental question at the core of the prodemocratic action argument and the right to democracy. What is the situation if a
people choose a non-democratic government? Is the international community entitled
to then intervene and impose one? 114
Whilst it may appear completely unimaginable to a citizen living in the West that
anyone if given a choice between democratic institutions and non-democratic
institutions would choose the latter, it is still feasible, and one shouldn’t let cultural
relativism cloud any conclusions. Martin Wright when commenting on the French
Revolution wrote that the attempt by revolutionary France to “reorganize world
society” may have worked if the French had not been so “…sublimely incapable of
distinguishing between the universal rights of Man and French culture…”.115
Although initially the revolutionaries in France maintained the revolutionary values of
liberty and equality,116 such altruistic intentions did not last long and soon the French
used force to impose their ideals upon others, Belgium for example, and then the rest
of Europe, and so the road to the Napoleonic Empire began.117 Could this also be
what the U.S. (as the leading democracy proponent and “beacon on the hill”) is
aiming to achieve with unilateral pro-democratic action? The U.S. has not just
intervened in Nicaragua and Panama, its extensive history of intervention has
included military intervention, in Guatemala in 1954; the Dominican Republic in
1965, Grenada in 1983 and more recently Afghanistan and Iraq.118
The flurry of pro-democratic activity by the West (exemplified in US action owing to
its capacity and capability for the same) juxtaposed against the French experience
raises important questions in pro-democracy discourse. This is especially so in light of
the fact that universalist claims to democracy as an entitlement are characteristic of
Enlightenment perspectives and just like this perspectives, the push for the democratic
ideal sweeps aside contention and ignores radical dissent as if it did not exist. As a
result, the diversity of the democratic tradition is erased by these totalizing assertions
of unanimity and final truth. 119 It is to be recalled that both George Bush and Mikhail
Gorbachev greeted the end of the Cold War as the dawning of a new world order.
From Bush's expansive North American viewpoint, this was the birth of an
international consensus embracing the great U.S. ideal of freedom for all.120
Australia's Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, approvingly identified the components of
this global metamorphosis as “the promotion of democratic practices; the
consolidation of free market economies; collective resistance to aggression; and the
upholding of 'universal values.' “121 The new world order, according to then U.S.
President, George Bush Sr and other commentators, is the triumph of liberal
democracy over communism122 or, in more extreme views, the arrival of the end of
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history.123 With the ending of the Cold War and the opportunity for the globalization
of patriarchal and liberal forms of democracy under the banner of a new world order,
the West seeks to co-opt the international legal system to assist the agenda of Western
expansionism in the guise of promoting democracy and human rights. The pressure is
on the international legal system to legitimate these developments, specifically by
taking a role in standardizing and enforcing world-wide protective liberal democratic
forms 124 With the U.S. (owing to its immense power and influence) as lead
proponent, its overt and covert pro-democratic activity raises an important question
not too far removed from the issues that this article is grappling with: Is the US
acting like an empire or more bluntly is it indeed an empire? A positive response to
that question would appear ironic, since the US was formed through an act of
rebellion against British Imperialism, but irony is a poor substitute for denial, and
whilst the U.S. citizen, and indeed the U.S. government may vehemently refuse to
accept it, the U.S. Empire has existed since Theodore Roosevelt.125 In Ignatieff’s
eloquent assertion:
True, there are no American colonies and American corporations do not need
their governments to acquire territory by force in order to acquire new
markets. So the new empire is not like those of times past, built on colonies
and conquest. It is an empire lite, hegemony without colonies, a global sphere
of influence without the burden of direct administration and the risks of daily
policing…It is an empire, in other words, without consciousness of itself as
such. But that does not make it any less of an empire, that is, an attempt to
permanently order the world of states and markets according to its national
interests.126
Other commentators like Noam Chomsky share Ignatieff’s view, arguing that the
US’s emergence as the only true super power, after the Second World War (a
development capped with the crumbling of the Soviet Empire) is evidenced by the
fact that it “…undertook careful and sophisticated planning to organize the world
system in its interests.”127 Actions were taken; decisions made, dictators supported,
human rights abuses ignored, regimes “changed”:128 all so that the US corporations
and industry had access to new markets, to ensure its manufacturers had access to
resources particularly petroleum products in the Middle East, to protect its consumerbased economy. Certainly one of the reasons for the extent of the US intervention in
Latin America has been to protect US private investment.129 All else, such as the
championing the right to democracy, to “freedom” from the encroaching Communist
hordes, was empty rhetoric.130 So extensive was the US interest defined, that any
nationalist group, any leader, any development of so-called “independent” thought,
(namely something or someone that would not follow US policy), became demonized
as an “enemy to freedom” and action was swift to follow.131 One of the motivating
factors behind the Cold War was to use military spending and the development of the
industrial--military complex to keep alive a struggling US economy.132 Since the end
of the Cold War, US military doctrine has shifted to focus on “low intensity conflict”,
in order to “…project power into other regions and maintain access to distant markets
and resources.”133 Does this sound like an attempt to organize the international
community for the sake and benefit of the US and not for the benefit of the world’s
peoples? Given the nature of the U.S. economy, and the desire expressed above to
ensure protection of U.S. access to “distant markets”, wouldn’t it make sense to
ensure that other nations too retained a similar economy? Thus another explanation
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for the push by Western liberal democracies for their style of governance to become
the only style of government is economics. The structure of the U.S. is not so much
based on liberal democracy but liberal economics. Brad Roth in his article examining
and evaluating the progress of democracy makes the link between liberalism [freedom
from interference by the State or the government] and a “market-society” abundantly
clear.134 As one commentator, a defender of U.S. policy has said:
For 200 years the United States has preserved almost unsullied the original
ideals of the Enlightenment: the belief in the God-given rights of the
individual, the inherent rights of free assembly and free speech, the blessings
of free enterprise, the perfectability of man, and above all, the universality of
these values.135 [Emphasis added.]
So is it a right to free enterprise rather than human rights that the Western nationstates are seeking to impose on others, when they support a right to democracy? Or
perhaps more accurately is it a right of the U.S. to free enterprise and the rest of the
international community to become modern-day slaves of the US economy and
corporations?136 Certainly one of the goals argued to be crucial for a successful postwar reconstruction of Iraq is the introduction of a capitalist economy.137 Further there
is much support for what is labeled as “neo-colonialism” that is the creation of
economic dependency upon more advanced, industrial nations, usually in the West.138
According to the theory of neo-colonialism, most Third World nations have
become dependent on the international economic system dominated by the
Western… powers and Japan for markets, technology, financing and even
basic foodstuffs to such a point that these less-developed countries may be
called “hooked”: they cannot do with their dependence, but, just as well, they
cannot do without it. They cannot do with dependence because their form of
incorporation into the international system has tended to preclude
their industrialization, relegating them instead to the less dynamic forms of
growth associated with agriculture or the extractive industries.139
Whether economics is the motivating factor behind pro-democratic action would
require an extensive examination beyond the scope of this present paper. However
one point can be made with confidence, Western liberal democracies do not impose
democracy, simply out of altruism, because they believe it is a legal norm or the best
way to protect human rights,140 but simply because it was and continues to be in
pursuit of their national self-interests.141 Whenever the right to democracy is argued
we should remember the famed U.S. State Department official George Kennan, who
stated in 1948:
…. We [the American people] need not deceive ourselves that we can afford
the luxury of altruism and world benefaction. We should cease to talk about
such vague and unreal objectives as human rights, the raising of living
standards and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to
have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by
idealistic slogans, the better.142 [Emphasis added]
The statement by George Kennan though relating to the U.S. nonetheless captures the
essence of actions that are mounted by other states (especially Western) in most
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spheres, and in the context of this Article, in pro-democratic action. Few see the
international community’s ambivalent approach to pro-democratic intervention as
optimal. More immediate geostrategic interests often demand that potential
intervenors tolerate or even support governments that are either undemocratic, or only
marginally democratic. Of necessity, then, attitudes toward pro-democratic
intervention are “awkwardly selective.”143 Selectivity may be morally indefensible,
but politically inescapable. Various suggestions have been made for circumventing
problems of selectivity, but no hard and fast ideas have yet emerged.144 Though
governments are generally unwilling to intervene themselves, they are reluctant to let
others do so for them. The result is that in the rare cases in which intervention is
authorized, it is effectively delegated to the most interested available actor.145 For
instance in the Haitian situation, it was the United States and the same pattern has
been played out in numerous instances. This pattern remains predictable. These actors
often press for outcomes which are noted as much for their compatibility with the
actors’ own interests as for their compatibility with universal norms or the specific
interests of the affected state.146
The question of the role of the U.N. naturally arises from the observation above which
may be considered cynical. The authors note that despite many facets of the U.N.
Charter being associated with democratic ideas, recognition of the sovereign equality
of member states and a commitment to the self-determination of peoples, closer
examination reveals that these two ideals are considerably qualified by the practice of
the United Nations. The undemocratic structures of the United Nations rely on the
assumption that peace is more likely to result from the consolidation of world power
arrangements than from deepening democracy which would involve challenging
global inequalities. Other international organizations and processes such as the
hierarchical and Western-dominated structure of the international economic system
reflect this assumption. These examples show that, in practice, the goal of democracy
in international relations is compromised by the United Nations' deference to the
current distribution of world power among states.
The U.N.’s and for that matter the international community’s reluctance to intervene
forcefully in states still subject to dictatorial rule may represent a failure of political
will: a refusal to shoulder the burden of bringing the benefits of democratic
governance to populations ruled by military thugs and parasitic elites. For others, the
U.N.’s recent willingness to authorize intervention in Haiti, Rwanda, Somalia, and
elsewhere represents a revival of western imperialism: a cynical pursuit of western
economic and strategic interests in the name of universal values. Either way difficult
choices are presented. Failure to act is condemned but a willingness to act is viewed
with suspicion. Not surprising this is the result of a lack of definite content and
contour regarding democracy, and accepted criteria for intervention of any sort.
How is the international community or indeed any national government to interpret
U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, as a necessary means of achieving a democratic end, or
as simply another example of the US “restructuring” the world in a manner to protect
its access to markets and to protect its own national interests?147 How can the
international community objectively answer such a question? The answer lies in the
I.C.J.’s judgment in the Nicaragua Case in view of the fact that the ICJ is the preeminent judicial organ of the UN created to prevent conflict, assist the peaceful
resolution of international disputes and further the ideals of the U.N. system. If the
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experts of the I.C.J. recognize that there exists a right of nation-states to determine
their own political system free from outside interference then what right has the US or
indeed any nation-state to impose by force a democratic government? After all isn’t
the forcible imposition of democracy “undemocratic”? Essentially if a peoples’ ability
to exercise their right to self-determination is so restricted that there is only one form
of economic political system that they can choose; isn’t that a denial of their rights as
a people? Doesn’t this make a mockery of the whole right to self-determination; isn’t
this in effect a form of oppression from a foreign and alien power, namely the
West?148Isn’t this a form of imperialism?
Like a chameleon changing colors, imperialism may be expected to appear in
different form but with similar consequences. We would be naïve indeed not
to anticipate that among its chief practitioners may well be some of its former
victims and most outspoken critics.149
Some may bridle at the suggestion that pro-democratic action is a form of neocolonialism, but the similarities with colonialism cannot be denied. In his examination
of a global history of colonization Marc Ferro noted that whilst there were many
varied reasons behind the colonial movement: economic imperatives to find markets
to cater to the new industries as a result of the industrial revolution; because it was an
inevitable step in the evolution of a Marxist utopia; a chance to cure social ills by the
forceful expulsion of convicts; as a cheap source of colonial labor; strategic concerns;
religious crusades; he noted that whatever may have been the original motivation it
soon became lost as Western societies became convinced of their superiority, and
when combined with their technical ability, they had the means and the desire to bring
“civilization”, to colonize.150
That is how it came about that a cultural concept, civilization, and a value
system came to have specific economic and political function. Not only did
these countries have to safeguard the right of Europeans to define the meaning
of civilization – which actually guaranteed their pre-eminence--but the
protection of this right became, in addition, the moral raison d’etre of the
conquerors.151
Combined with the theories of “Social Darwinism”, the Western powers did not
believe their actions to be oppression, but rather a kindness; of performing a noble
deed: the imperative need to civilize so-called lesser races for the glory of monarch
and God: a sort of noble crusade or as it has been described, the “White man’s
burden”.
In his great goodness the white man does not destroy the inferior species. He
educates them, unless they are deemed to be not “human”, like the Bushmen
or the aborigines of Australia who were not even given a name--in which case,
he exterminates them.152
The implications of imposing protective Western democratic forms as a condition of
the recognition of a state at international law are far-reaching and it is not an idle
argument that it creates new opportunities for Western imperialism, despite the bold
claim made by Professor Thomas Franck that people almost everywhere now demand
that government be validated by a western-style parliamentary, multiparty, democratic
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process ... Very few argue that parliamentary democracy is a western illusion and a
neo-colonialist trap for unwary Third World peoples.153 Criticizing this sweeping
claim, Professor Dianne notes that “Franck assumes a world consensus about the
liberal democratic form. Further, he asserts that the foundation for this global
development lies in the U.S. Declaration of Independence.”154 Professor Otto further
notes that Professor Franck’s sweeping assertion is shared by other international
commentators as well.155 Reacting to this holistic position, Professor Otto points out
that “[s]uch assertions generalize democratic experience and silence the knowledge
produced by the many democratic movements which would decry such origins and
associations.”156 While admitting that Professor Franck and similarly minded
commentators represent a strong and well-reasoned viewpoint, nonetheless, the
authors share Professor Otto’s cautionary sentiment which counters the self-righteous
tenor of Professor Franck and other commentators. It is this self-righteous tenor in the
democratic discourse that contributes greatly to stifling any debate regarding
democratic diversity and communality.
Another contentious ground is the issue of pro-democratic action as a form of neocolonialism. One argument against classifying pro-democratic action as a form of
neo-colonialism as espoused by some proponents of the right to democracy is the
universal nature of the right. Professor Dianne Otto in a critique of this position
observes that though international legal discourse has developed democratic
conceptions in human rights law and some support for expansive versions of
democracy may be found in human rights instruments, this support is confined in
practice, however, by an overriding emphasis on policing formal electoral and voting
processes rather than on promoting more flexible and participatory forms of
democracy.157 She further avers that the dominance by liberalism, conceives of
human rights in universal and essentialist terms resulting in a Western-centric
domination of democracy discourse.158 Rounding up her observation, she tersely
asserts that
From a critical legal studies perspective, the emphasis in liberal rights
discourse on individualized and formalistic rights results in indeterminate
and malleable constructions of human rights that create impediments to
progressive social change by abstracting and atomizing human experience.159
The next section of this Article ventures into the murkiness of the democratic ideal as
a universal right questioning this position through a discussion of political armies and
the issue of economic factors. Proposals by democracy’s proponents to standardize
and centrally monitor the procedures of global democratic change constitute an
attempt to control and homogenize democratic developments. This need to control is
consistent with protective forms of liberal democracy. It is a defensive response to
developments that have the potential to alter the inequitable global distribution of
power and to involve people, as collectives and individuals, in processes of selfdetermination within and beyond the boundaries of states. The authors are well aware
that this matter is intricate and complex, but their modest aim is to put the question
mark to what might be termed as an accepted position or the only desirable position.
VI: The Nature of the Democratic Ideal: Is it a Universal Crop?

22

Many of the features of Western democracy are so familiar through endorsement at
the international and regional levels that it is tempting to see them as universal.
However this whilst true, nevertheless does not discount certain bases unique to
individual states that create room for suspicion. If Western democratic principles are
becoming universal, then it is largely due to the pervasive influence of Western values
and ideas throughout the world, and the influence of the global economy. The sticking
point is the apparent inflexibility by the West to allow these values to be affected (in a
positive) manner by the values of other socio-political orders. Fearing to kindle
(negatively) the idea of relativism, Western democracy sets up barriers of
righteousness, binds nations by an appeal to universality and points to the good faith
and benevolence of liberal-democracy. The threat and fear of international
ostracization is not the best way to go about advancing the democratic agenda.
Regimes that are oppressive may need to be replaced:
… but as the history of France after the French Revolution demonstrated, the
danger of despising all that had gone before, and starting afresh, is that for
generations afterwards a society may stagger from one constitutional
experiment to another, with much violence and bloodshed in its path.160
The wholesome abandonment of traditions cuts a society loose from its moorings.
Democracy stands to gain from being located within the general socio-political
landscape of a nation rather than being seen as a wholesale export of the West, which
prescribes a Western specific template. The sense of ownership by a citizenry in a
new political architecture contributes immensely to its support: “A monocultural
tradition may successfully adapt itself to cultural pluralism only if it avoids lapsing
into moral relativism.”161
When discussing the plans to create a democracy within Iraq, Adeed and Karen
Dawisha argued that the “…success or failure of democracy in Iraq will depend on
whether the country’s new political institutions take into consideration its unique
social and communal makeup.”162 And later: “Restructuring Iraq’s political system
will be laden with difficulties, but it will certainly be feasible. At the same time, the
blueprint for Iraq’s democracy must reflect the unique features of Iraqi society.”163 As
the authors recognize “one size doesn’t fit all, but the same design can fit all with
necessary adjustments”! Thus their recommendations include the need to recognize
Iraq’s diversity of religions, cultures and ethnic groups. As such “…the trick is to
work out a constitutional arrangement that makes sense of Iraq’s social and cultural
mosaic, transforming diversity into an agent for positive change.” 164Their
recommendations include a return to constitutional monarchy, retaining the current 18
administrative units rather than adopt a religious or ethnic based federal model (in
other words denying the Kurds and Shiites a right to autonomy), a role for the clergy
and former middle level members of the Baath party, and a reduced state
bureaucracy.165Most importantly the authors recommend that: “For the sake of all
parties involved, the American endeavor in Iraq must not end in a more agreeable
form of dictatorship or a successor regime that promises nothing beyond greater
cooperation with Washington.”166 There must be a genuine commitment by
governments. Where democracy is seen mainly as a fad, and an avenue to cordial
relations with donors, it loses its spirit.
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Who is to say that Western democracy is the only form of democracy? The
ideological competitors of liberal democracy do not after all, deny the role of popular
will as the basis of governmental authority; the often-used terms “people’s
democracy” and “socialist democracy” are affirmations of fidelity to this notion, the
revolutionary struggle (in some way or another) being the ultimate embodiment of the
popular will. As Jorge Dominquez summarized the Cuban Government’s view:
“[r]evolutionary rule is not legitimated by voting; rather, an election is legitimated by
revolutionary rule.”167 This is not a barren argument. Article 21 of the Universal
Declaration after all can be read syllogistically to mean that the basis of governmental
authority is such popular will as has been expressed in the elections. Whereas nonliberal regimes would prefer it to mean that the popular will is (in some abstract
sense) the basis of--and therefore expressed by--governmental authority, and is also
expressed in elections. The Covenant version simplifies the matter by leaving
undefined the relationship, if any, not only between authority and elections, but also
between authority and participation.168
It is of importance that democracy even in Western Europe and the US was by no
means a constant and consistent development.169 In Europe it experienced upheavals
generated by socio-political and economic factors--interrupted as it was by the Roman
Republic which became the Roman Empire, then the Dark Ages, and the odd war
such as the Peloponnesian War, the English Civil War, the French Revolution, the
American Revolution, the American Civil War and the Napoleonic Wars, and the odd
totalitarian regime too, such as Oliver Cromwell’s reign in England,170 and the odd
abuse of human rights such as the repression of the Scottish Highlands after the battle
of Culloden,171 and the more recent excesses of the former European colonial
overlords. 172
On May 8, 1945, the very day Paris was celebrating the defeat of Germany,
Muslim riots around the town of Setif in Western Algeria claimed over a
hundred European lives. Reaction was swift. French planes strafed forty-four
Muslim hamlets, a cruiser offshore bombarded more, and groups of settler
vigilantes summarily executed hundreds of natives. As testimony to the
ferocity of the repression, how many Muslims died in these events has never
been determined, though estimates range from 6,000 to 45,000.173
As one commentator notes Western liberal democracy may not appeal to every citizen
in the global community, simply because they do not cherish the West’s idealized
version of private life, the protection of individualism and consumerism. Instead they
may desire to become part of something “bigger than themselves”; to “mould the
world anew”: to become part of destiny or history.174 In other words Western
liberalism is insufficient to satisfy the urge, which he argues is so common and
prevalent in the human psychic, of belonging to something grand, some historical
moment, some dynamic and apparently benevolent movement.
Nothing that humans experience can compare with the intoxication which
comes from feeling oneself to be part of some great heave of history, from an
awareness that the whole community is on the move. It was what the French
felt during the Napoleonic period, the Germans before the First World War
and still more so under the Nazis, many Russians even under the tyranny of
Joseph Stalin, the Iranians in the initial phase of their Islamic republic.175
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This desire is clearly evident in religious crusades or jihad, and in revolutions, and
will prevent the adoption of democracy, particularly by a group that has become
alienated by a lack of political or economic power. And as the example of the success
that the Nazi party and fascism had in post-war Germany, such movements can infect
an entire people and sweep away all thoughts of Western liberalism. This is perhaps
one of the most important and overlooked reasons why democracies fail. Many
societies and peoples do not share the belief that with democracy comes freedom, or
that it will simply improve their lot in life. But there are certainly many examples,
such as in the former U.S.S.R., where a change to democracy has had the opposite
effect a worsening of the economy and living standards of a vast proportion of a
people.176
The breakdown of an economy, or worse of society as a whole has in the past led to
the creation of political armies, where the general population is panicked into a frantic
search for any entity that will create stability, national cohesion, and security. Political
armies have been defined as those military forces that “…consider involvement in- or
control over- domestic politics and the business of government to be part of their
legitimate function.”177 As such political armies are the nemesis of democratic
governance, since it is accepted that the central indicator of democratic government is
civil political institutions and processes based on the consent of the people secured
through their participation in free and fair elections managed by civil institutions
rather than the stereotypic tinderbox socio-political landscape that military dominance
is built on that seems to ensure elections of flee and flare. A nation under military rule
has always been presented as the classic prima facie case of undemocratic rule. Thus
the premise that flows from this assumption negates any form of military involvement
in governance. The army should be a neutral institution of the State falling within the
discipline of those whom the ballot has ordained, but armies often venture into the
political arena, frequently justifying their actions to be necessary to counter such
dangers as collapse, or social disintegration and the proliferation of violent conflict.
How does a “vice” give rise to a “virtue”?178
While generally political armies meddle in governance whether directly or indirectly
to the chagrin of the citizenry, this is half the story. In some countries their
interference in governance is actually condoned. The armed forces with its inherent
nationalism and organization will always appear to be the entity to restore a
breakdown in law and order and guarantee it when a nation falls into anarchy and
chaos (whether this be reflected in armed conflict or serious civil unrest).
Maintenance of law and order is seen as a prerequisite to providing the necessary
conducive environment for society to further socio-political and economic agendas.
But then, often once the army leaves the barracks for the streets, it frequently heads to
the presidential palace. One such series of examples can be found in the 1930’s in
Latin America where the middle class was not ‘strong enough to fill the gap left by
the breakdown of oligarchic hegemony “… and this led to a ‘middle class military
coup.”179 There are many other examples, such as the coups by the Turkish
military,180 Pakistan and the bloody takeover in Algeria181. In his televised address to
the nation on 13 October 1999, justifying the military coup in Pakistan, General
Pervez Musharraf mentioned the turmoil and uncertainty in the country and a
crumbling economy due to the self-serving policies of individuals wielding influence
in government, factors that were rocking the foundations of the nation.182
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…My singular concern has been the well being of our country alone. This has
been the sole reason that the army has willingly offered its services for nationbuilding tasks, the results of which have already been judged by you. All my
efforts and counsel to the government it seems were to no avail. Instead they
now turned their attention on the army itself. Despite all my advice they tried
to interfere with the armed forces, the last remaining viable institution in
which all of you take so much pride and look up to, at all times, for the
stability, unity and integrity of our beloved country.183
Similar language was used by one of Turkey’s most revered figures Kemal Ataturk,
eight decades earlier when describing the situation of the Ottoman Empire in
September 1917. The military hero emerged as a charismatic leader of the Turkish
national liberation struggle in 1919, creating the modern state of Turkey where even
today the armed forces are a good example of a political army.184
When there is an incredibly strong identification of the army with the domestic fate of
the nation,185 the dynamics change. The armed forces become involved in “nationbuilding”.186 The danger is that the conservative nature of military forces world-wide,
the very factor that people hope will bring about stability, is also the very factor that
can prevent the army from relinquishing control, as eventually the armed forces see
any development or any political devolution of power that is not subject to their
control as being a potential threat to stability: thus preventing the return to civil
society and more importantly to savage human rights abuse.
These features [systematic abuse of human rights abuse, corrupt or
unaccountable governments] seem to prevail under political armies. Close
control of politics and the state by an institution built on hierarchy, the chain
of command, monothetic ideology and deployment of the means of coercion is
liable to fall short of the requirements of good governance. Political armies
may quickly see political party competition as instability, public policy
deliberations as inefficiency, and opposition to the established power
hierarchy as dissent or even treason towards the state and the nation. The
application of an uncontested military logic to politics in dealing with such
perceived flaws and problems has in many cases produced the abject kind of
dictatorship that excels in internal warfare, state terrorism, and murky
politics.187
Even when the military return power back to a civil administration, there is no
guarantee that they will not seize it again, particularly if their interests or position is
threatened or again if they believe that the civil administration is adopting a course of
action, which in the army’s opinion will to catastrophic consequences for the nation.
… even in countries in which the military have now returned to the barracks as
part of the reassertion of civilian politics, current societal problems still make
the consolidation of democratic governance an uncertain endeavor. Is it not
possible that, if real or perceived threats to the social or political integrity of
the nation are sufficiently strong, a reversal may take place that would bring
the military back into politics, even to the point of again assuming direct
control of government?188
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Economic stability and prosperity does play a role in keeping the army at bay by
preventing social chaos and political anarchy by incensed masses. After all a fair
share of revolutions have been spawned by this very factor where the wealth and
benefits of the community are restricted to elites as a nation progresses. But tied up to
the issue economic factor is the assertion of the authors that imposition of democracy
will not succeed if it does not create an economic system that encourages and allows
for class transition from poverty to wealth, something which a healthy middle class
represents. Thus to impose a democratic government upon a community that is
economically unprepared for it, poses the risk that the community will slide into
anarchy or despotism: and that is the true danger of pro-democratic action.189 A good
starting point would be the following observation:
Britain’s progress towards democracy was spurred by an entrepreneurial
middle class largely independent of the state. In Germany, the economy was
much more closely connected to the government, and the industrialization of
the country occurred as a result of the alliance between the state and the
traditional elites. There was no robust middle class to agitate for greater
freedoms and representation.190
Kaplan contends that democracy will not succeed unless a “middle class” develops:191
“As almost all political theorists agree, a fully developed middle class is essential to
an effective and sustainable democracy.”192 Discussing the evolution of a nation-state
and nationalism, Porter like Kaplan, places a great deal of emphasis on the importance
of “rising urban class” or a middle class and its role in establishing a stable political
community.
The expansion of trade and industry, the development of communications, the
drift from the countryside to the towns, all made for the growth of a middle
class which increasingly chafed at the multiplicity of customs barriers and
other feudal restrictions, and which aspired to political influence
commensurate with its economic strength and educational attainments.193
In fact it could be argued that even the form in which the middle class takes shape is
important for the adoption of a democracy. The middle class’s development and
success must not be linked to or even be a result of state-orchestrated client-patron
processes that artificially create class stratifications. It must be independent otherwise
a totalitarian style state is likely to evolve, Iraq is one such example.194 Since financial
success is linked to the state then the state must survive at all costs, thus individuals
and the class of persons within a community that retain the most economic and
political power, rather than seek political pluralism and true democracy through open
and fair elections, seek to create a system whereby there is only the state, and that
means one party: thus establishing the potential for human rights abuses.
Kaplan’s comparison of the unemployment and civil unrest in the imposed democratic
regimes in Germany and Italy during the inter-war years with the Sudan,195
strengthens the assertion that the economic environment plays a role in shaping
governance. Explaining further, Kaplan contends that that the violent consequences of
the failed democracies in Sudan and other communities was due to many citizens of
these communities do not get the opportunity to see or share in the benefits of a
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Western-style parliamentary system, since they are locked in a cycle of poverty and
crime:196 a phenomenon, which is at the core of the rise of terrorist organizations, and
is also present in many conflicts such as between Palestine and Israel.197 Whilst it is
too simplistic to argue that history repeats itself, there is certainly a lot to be said for
ignoring its lessons.
History is littered with examples of failed democracies, the current crisis in the
Solomon Islands is the most recent198, but it is the collapse of the Weimar Republic in
1932 that proponents of pro-democratic action would do well to remember and take
heed, since history is littered with the bitter consequences of that failure: Auschwitz,
Dachau, the use of nuclear weapons, millions dead; a world left in ruins. Kaplan notes
that when democracies fail, they do so in a horrific fashion, often being replaced by
authoritarian regimes far worse than any that may have preceded them, and resulting
in massive human rights abuses. Totalitarian regimes like those of Adolf Hitler and
Mussolini came to power through democracy.199 Cambodia’s experiment with
democracy ended in Hun Sen’s coup.200 Democracy in Sudan led to anarchy that led
to a terrifying and brutal military regime and civil war. The US sponsored democracy
in the 1990’s in Afghanistan led to the rise of the Taliban. The failure of the US to
create a multi-party system in Kurdistan created a power vacuum filled by Saddam
Hussein, who later used chemical weapons against Iraqi Kurds: and who can forget
the failure of democracy and a multi-party system in Rwanda?201
It is also true that there have been “successes” such as the creation of West Germany
in the aftermath of the Second World War, but we must ask ourselves is it worth
taking the risk? Does the “end justify the means”? Or will the fruit of the West’s
endeavors taste bittersweet?
VII. Democracy: Is the Fruit of our Labors as Sweet as We Believe?

Many commentators believe that one explanation for the preference for a democratic
government is that the very nature of democracy with its inherent system of checks
and balances,202 ensures protection of human rights,203 and thus democratic
governments are considered less likely to lead to excesses of authority in their
dealings with their citizens.204 Franck also argues that there are mutual benefits to
both those that govern and the governed, in a system where there is habitual voluntary
obedience.205 The government by obtaining the consent of the governed is crucial in
obtaining “validation” of their governance and political system within the
international community.206 However for others the answer is more obvious.
Democratic governments enable some input from those that are governed.207
According to Dasgupta and Maskin, democracy provides “political competition.”
Competition in the political sphere not only enables citizens to shop among
contenders to govern, it also enables them to shop for ideas on governance.
Pluralism in the political domain is akin to competition in the market place.
Competition is desirable even in an unchanging environment: it discourages
inefficacy. Competition is necessary to keep incumbents from slacking.208
So if a government is oppressive, autocratic, or simply disliked, its mandate to govern
is revoked by an election, not by guns and violence: something that cannot be
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achieved in a dictatorship, regardless of how benevolent it happens to be.209 In
summary a democratic government by involving, enfranchising and more importantly,
seemingly to protect the very people that it rules, guarantees its own viability and
existence, thus assisting it to outlast competing political systems such as communism,
dictatorships and totalitarianism. Democracy’s ascendancy over other competing
political systems appears to many to be so comprehensive as to be irreversible: or in
the words of one commentator a sign of “the end of history”.210
As powerful and persuasive as such arguments may be, they require further
examination. Looking at the history of democracy’s traditional strongholds--the West-few of the countries can claim no skeletons in the closet. Many in the past have had
shameful practices that were given the imprimatur of the law and supported by
government institutions. One need only take a cursory look at say the US which has
espoused democratic ideals from day one of its creation to see that in yesteryears
universal suffrage or freedom from discrimination was very much present, unless of
course you were “disabled” by gender or color then the dynamics changed.211
Discrimination and human rights breaches continue in the US today and has not been
restricted to the US alone.212 In 1902 the newly created Federal Parliament of
Australia denied all indigenous Australians the right to vote, and it was not until 1962
that all indigenous Australians received the right to vote in Federal Elections.213 Other
examples of human rights breaches include massacres of indigenous peoples such as
Australian Aborigines,214 or US Indians,215 and also the actions of Western
governments during conflicts such as the British government’s policy during the Boer
War of interning Boer civilians in camps that a later conflict would have described as
“concentration camps”. There are modern examples too, Columbian drug traffickers
have been trained by Western and Israeli personnel,216and Cuba has suffered terribly
at the hands of US trade embargoes.217
Democracy while a tested and proven concept is still not the ultimate solution to all
oppressive government and all repressive internal practices.
Democracy is hardly a panacea, and it will not by itself either resolve
profound domestic problems (such as wide inequalities in income, severe
ethnic conflicts, and insufficient resources to meet rising demands) or
necessarily generate an international order that is more peaceful or
prosperous.218
Certainly democracy has not brought economic prosperity to many Latin American
nations like Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and more recently Peru, where the holding
of fair and free elections, have not halted corruption, inflation or economic decline.
Even after democracy was restored to Haiti, it did not restore stability or prevent
famine.219 This phenomenon is not restricted to Latin America alone, democratic
Russia remains impoverished, so to Albania, and so to do parts of India, the world’s
largest democracy India, where states like Bihar remain in virtual semi-anarchy and
economic chaos.220 In fact there are numerous examples where non-democratic
authoritarian regimes have been more successful in promoting successful economic
reform than their democratic counterparts.221
Contrary to what some have argued above,222 democracy and the electoral process do
not guarantee protection of human rights as the internees in Guantamao Bay have
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discovered.223 Kaplan notes that in Bosnia ‘…democracy legitimized the worst war
crimes in Europe since the Nazi era.’224 In Mali, as Kaplan notes, a so-called
“democratic success story”, elections were marred by riots and murder.225 Chomsky
estimates that the US is either directly or indirectly responsible for the deaths of
approximately 200,000 people in Central America during the 1980’s.226 As the author
notes in a subsequent work, this figure places Libya’s human rights breaches into
perspective.227 Who can forget the images of ranks of South Korean Riot Police,
looking like the evil “storm-troopers” from the science fiction film Star Wars,
clashing with student protestors, almost a signature image of South Korea during the
1980’s: who can forget Bloody Sunday in Northern Ireland?228
Another issue that confronts democracy is the need to ensure that it does not turn a
multiethnic nation into a majoritarian dictatorship. Where the minority are effectively
sidelined from actively participating in government despite their ability to vote by a
majority whose dominance in government, and thus affairs of the State is guaranteed
by the ballot. Not an idle argument in multi-ethnic states. One need only look to
Africa to see the effect of the straight application of one person, one vote in
heterogeneous states dominated by one or two communities. Generally speaking, the
threat of human rights abuses is particularly high in territories where there is an ethnic
minority. An ethnic minority can remain under threat from a majority, despite the
existence of an electoral process since it is likely that “…the will of the majority will
simply reflect the position of the most numerous ethnic group within the territory.”229
So an ethnic minority can be repressed or subject to discriminatory processes in a
democratic system, or rather in spite of the appearance of political empowerment
created by the electoral process, and this can lead to an escalation of ethnic violence.
Commentators conveniently forget that the Former Republic of Yugoslavia was a
democracy before and during its descent into darkness.230
The inability of a particular ethnic group to control political events which
affect it is unlikely to result in dissatisfaction amongst the members of that
group; that dissatisfaction may in some cases be so extreme as to induce the
group to secede and form a nation-state of its own, in which it can control
political events. This is what happened in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia
when a democratic system was introduced. The exercise of popular
sovereignty within those multi-ethnic states led to political fragmentation.231
It could be argued that such examples, involved governments that are/were not “true
democracies” or were merely “isolated” examples.232 Such an argument is too
simplistic and often fails to make a thorough historical examination, since it avoids
many inconvenient questions such as which nation-states have been constantly
involved both directly and indirectly in military conflict since the end of the Second
World War-why the US and Israel: two democracies.233 How many civilians,
Lebanese as well as Palestinians have been killed by Israel?234 In India, the world’s
largest democracy, “communal” violence between Hindu and Muslim factions in
Godhra, Gujurat in 2002, has resulted in at least 2,000 civilians being killed.235
Human Rights Watch in a report revealed that there is evidence of complicity in the
killings of Muslims by the Hindu-dominated State government.236 The Gujarat State
government has been criticized by India’s own National human Rights Commission,
for failing to stop the communal violence, and subsequent investigations by Indian
human Rights’ Activists have revealed that senior ministers form Gujarat’s Chief
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Minister Modi’s cabinet have been involved in planning attacks against Muslims.
There were at least 40 such attacks during 2002. And it appears that State authorities
are not prosecuting those responsible in what could be one of the worse ‘cover-ups’ In
Indian history.237
Finally, what sort of democracy is to be imposed? This is not begging the question. In
Algeria during the electoral campaign of April 1999, the army’s intelligence
department known as Military Security organized the elections. Any candidates who
opposed the role of the army or would in the army’s opinion be unable to win an
election were denied the right to run for the elections, thus creating a very noticeable
lack of opposition candidates. This was resolved by the ‘selection’ of candidates who
would not jeopardize the military’s grasp on power. In return loyal individuals were
given selected ministerial positions.238 Clearly this is not a true democracy, would a
Western model be more appropriate?
The trends in the West--the cradle of democracy--are alarming. A pattern of electoral
success in elections being dependent upon wealth and a generous expenditure of the
same is emerging. Leading the way is democracy’s most vigorous proponent and
defender--the US. In 1996 a grand total of US $2.2 billion was spent on federal
elections in the US.239 A total of US $499 million was spent by the candidates on the
elections for the US Congress, and US $341 million was spent on the Senate elections.
The average Senate seat “cost” the bargain price of US$4.7 million. In 1998 eighteen
non-incumbent candidates were millionaires, four worth more than US $50 million. In
1996, 92% of the seats in the US House of Representatives and 88% in the Senate
were won by those who spent the most money; in 1998 the figures rose to 96% of the
House and 91 % of the Senate.240 Whilst there are reassuring examples of candidates
of “modest means” winning elections over wealthy candidates, the sad reality is that
in the US democratic system, money does make a difference; money buys elections,
being a millionaire provides considerable assistance.241
Perhaps the US is an example of a democracy gone mad, but the nasty contagion that
links money almost directly to electoral office is evident in lesser but nevertheless
worrying proportions throughout Western Europe and naturally is spreading to the
eager “pupils” in the developing world where ministerial cabinets frequently reflect
the moneyed list. Naturally, the citizenry in the developing world will come off
second best. Most are desperately poor, largely illiterate and ignorant of the fact that
the dollar given the day before by a campaign agent does not bind them morally or
legally to vote for the particular candidate. Before the masses in the developing world
have even been able to grapple with democratic tenets, poor civic education has seen
to it that their votes are already mortgaged to “machine politics”.
Money is distorting democracy now. Money not only determines who wins,
but often who runs. If you’ve got a good idea and $10,000 and I’ve got a
terrible idea and $1 million, I can convince people that the terrible idea is a
good one.242
Is this the type of democracy the West seeks to impose on other communities? A
process that is a corruption of the very nature of democracy; representative
government, since the representatives are from one specific socio-economic class (the
others can simply not afford it) or are sponsored by members of one socio-economic

31

class, with all the obligations such sponsorship creates, then how can such a
government claim to be a “government by the people for the people”? To impose such
a system on already impoverished nation-states such as say Iraq does not bode well
for the longevity of a democratic government, since nothing much will change for the
impoverished class, they remain sunk in poverty, powerless and alienated. In other
words there is no development of a middle class, merely a change in ruling elites.
Segments of the community remain disenfranchised from the benefits of Western
liberalism, but can see how others maintain their position and therefore ensure they
will not be denied these benefits. Such alienation must be all the bitter, when one of
the reasons given to impose democracy is to deliver a people from evil. At least under
a totalitarian regime, there are no illusions of freedom or justice.
VIII. Conclusion

At the international level support for democracy is still expressed in general terms.
Most important, there has been relatively broad (though by no means uniform)
acceptance of the principle that elections should entail competition among multiple
political parties--something Soviet-bloc states rejected for years.243 Additionally,
substantial international agreement now exists on many of the procedural and
substantive prerequisites for free and fair elections.244 Elections, however, are only
part of any democratic system.245 They may assist in the formation of a government
responsive to the popular will, but they do not guarantee such a government.246 More
importantly they do not guarantee “good governance” and freedom from human rights
abuses.
As yet, no international consensus exists on clear-cut criteria that should be used to
judge whether or not a particular government is substantively “democratic.”247 In part,
this is because many states still do not share the West’s enthusiasm for liberal,
parliamentary democracy. Some states, in particular Islamic and Asian states, view
much of the recent rhetoric about democratic governance as a misplaced attempt to
transplant Western institutions and structures of governance to countries with
radically different cultural and political traditions.248 In their view, any attempt to
impose a Western blueprint for democracy constitutes nothing short of cultural
imperialism.249 Accordingly, although many such states have joined halfheartedly in
the promulgation of resolutions and declarations proclaiming support for democracy
and the right of political participation,250 they also stress that each state has the
“sovereign right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and
cultural systems, whether or not they conform to the preferences of other states.”251
The civilizing mission that marked the age of imperialism became entrenched as a
fundamental aspect of international law and still continues to lurk in the shadows of
the contemporary international system in a number of different ways, despite radical
changes. What is remarkable is that despite changes which, in the conventional
history of international law mark important turning points, the basic structure of the
civilizing mission is reproduced: government in non-European states is wanting; the
essential characteristic of good government is government that reflects Eurocentric
features and thus both the need for detailed “international” standards developed to
ensure that “good government” is achieved but under laid with less than altruistic
motives.
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It is unquestionable that the citizenry in the developing world suffer enormous
hardships and difficulties, as a result, very often, of the corrupt and oppressive Third
World state.252 But what must be questioned in the narratives that support
international initiatives such as democracy is the world view that suggests, for
example, that the causes of oppression are entirely indigenous and that they may be
alleviated by the redeeming and neutral mechanism of universalized norms.253 ‘Real
democracy’ involves a complex relationship between the government and the
governed. Direct replication of successful Western models does not necessarily result
in successful transplants. For democracy to “work” it must evolve at pace of the
specific community rather than be imposed from above by a third party. This crucial
point has been overlooked by many proponents of the right to democracy, but has
been recognized by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. In his recent report to the
UN Security Council regarding the democratization crusade in Iraq, drawing on
various sentiments from different quarters and especially from the general sentiment
of the Iraqi citizenry, the UN Secretary-General candidly observes:
A common theme was that democracy should not be imposed from the
outside; it had to come from within. Iraqi political, religious and civic leaders
are currently reflecting on an Iraqi-led transition agenda.254
An imposition of democracy creates the perception of Western, in particular US
imperialism, rather than promote the concept of good governance. Good governance,
respect for civil liberty and separation of powers is at the heart of the right to
democracy, not necessarily a particular model of government be it a bicameral
legislature or an executive Prime Minister. The danger of not allowing democracy to
evolve creates the risk that the democracy will collapse into anarchy as in many of the
previously cited examples, or into a totalitarian regime with massive human rights
abuses, or simply a society dominated by political armies. Political armies happen to
represent a central problem to the democracy crusade, and as the situation in Turkey,
and Algeria show, political armies once they have become associated with the future
of the nation, can be very difficult to remove.
The question is then: how to find a middle path between prevalent authoritarian
political systems on the one hand, and potentially harmful international initiatives
narrowly focused on appearances rather than substance? It is not overly simplistic to
say that to transfer Western-Liberal democracy lock, stock and barrel to the
developing world or other “infant” democracies for that matter is problematic. The
fact is that this now “universalized” system grew in content and configuration in
Western societies shaped by occasions during a long course of centuries and reflected
certain distinct values that are a product of its history of class compromises over
centuries reflecting peculiar society-centric values. To impose this without limitation
or restraint on “infant” democracies is to displace positive established socio-cultural
structures with the result that in some cases the prevailing landscape becomes
confused or contradictory. Often in blindly following new constitutional orders,
“infant” democracies lose initiative to other equally needed political and
administrative reforms that are just as essential to the success of democracy.
Democracy’s history is clear-it is the most successful of the many political systems of
government but it must not be forgotten that among the rank and file of European
countries, democracy is not a monolithic concept. Different countries have modified,
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refined and institutionalized various forms of the basic concept in concert with local
realties and requirements. Even where in some Western European constitutions there
appears to be an enshrinement of one form or another of constitutional dictatorshipdemocracy prevails simply because the necessary mechanisms exist to curb extensive
state power inherent in all forms of government be they democratic or autocratic. It is
not State power that is the issue, it is the use of that power by government that is the
issue. We should bear in mind the admonition of Winston Churchill famed British
political and statesman:
… No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said
that democracy is the worst form of government except that all those other forms
that have been tried from time to time have failed.255
With the benefit of hindsight and international law, democracy is the way to go but it
must never be doubted that democracy should be homegrown. The grafts from the
West are an important starting point, but they should not be an end in themselves. No
graft thrives if it is not properly embedded in the scion, and the scion in this case is
the particular society. Incompatibility between the graft and scion can only be
addressed successfully through a recognition that freedom of the citizenry is the key
goal, and the real foundation of democracy should be subject to a much wider
discourse rather than a simple technical checklist. Despite the allusion in this Article
to the need to position democratic ideals within the particular socio-political context
of a country, it is obvious that to look at every nation individually could be to study
different socio-political structures for their own sake. Rather, with the invaluable aid
of liberal democracy, its rich historical lessons, its defined detail and sophistication, it
is an ideal from where we can glean what is “best.” After all liberal democracy has
developed over a long time and has been a subject to great discourse and exposition.
Nonetheless, leeway to refine and adapt its secondary features as opposed to basic
tenets should be given and this is important in embedding it firmly as a daily, practical
concept rather than as a period requirement. Representation should be manifest in
active as opposed to nominal participation such that “representation and participation
[are] experienced as part of a continuum.”256
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